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organizations they lead. Countless leaders are often too involved in promoting themselves, and see developing
subordinates as a sign of weakness.
The final chapter, “Afterthoughts—
‘My Way to Continue the Conversation . . . ,’” was initially confusing. It
did not flow with the rest of the book;
it seemed disjointed; it seemed to be
made up of random thoughts about a
variety of topics. I eventually realized
that it was Dunwoody’s way of discussing and underscoring contemporary
issues she believes are important.
During my almost thirty-year career in
the U.S. Army, I was privileged to serve
in the 10th Mountain Division with Ann
Dunwoody. Her technical and tactical
skills, along with her keen insight and
caring attitude, made her a positive role
model. It is fitting that she ends every
talk with the phrase “In the end, we’re all
just soldiers, but that’s the highest thing
you could claim to be.” Dunwoody’s legacy in the Army and the larger U.S. military will impact generations of young
Americans for years to come. This book
showcases her exceptional talents as an
army officer and leader. It is a mustread for leaders at all levels, in both
the military and other organizations.
THOMAS J. GIBBONS

Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War, by Orde F.
Kittrie. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2016. 504
pages. $29.95 (Kindle $14.41).

In Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War,
legal scholar Orde F. Kittrie analyzes the
increasing effectiveness of the use of law
to achieve objectives that not long ago
might have been achievable only using
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force. In one of the first major works
in English on the practice of lawfare,
Kittrie has written an important book
for lawyers, policy makers, and military
strategists. Successful strategic performance requires an appreciation of the
role of politics in war, and because law
is an intensely political matter it is an
integral part of the strategic operating
environment. Kittrie’s highly readable
Lawfare enhances our understanding of
the growing strategic potential of law.
This book is at once a history of lawfare,
a collection of representative case studies, and a resource for other researchers.
The foreword by former CIA director R.
James Woolsey Jr. is itself an interesting
read, setting up Kittrie’s analysis with a
description of the international legal arena as a sheriff-less “Wild West” exploited
by various governments and nonstate
actors. The author also describes his
own foray into lawfare as a professor
at Arizona State University, where his
analysis of Iran’s dependence on external
gasoline suppliers eventually led to the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010. Kittrie’s practical bent is evident throughout Lawfare, and he offers numerous
suggestions for incorporating lawfare
into U.S. national security strategy.
Among the strengths of Lawfare are the
concepts provided in the first chapter
that prepare the reader for the case
studies that follow. Kittrie begins with
a historical overview, tracing lawfare
back to the seventeenth century, when
Hugo Grotius used legal arguments to
bolster Dutch maritime power. Kittrie’s section on the literature of lawfare
provides a unique summary of the
leading works in the field. Kittrie breaks
down the practice of lawfare into two
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categories: instrumental lawfare—the
use of legal methods to achieve results
typically sought from kinetic weapons;
and compliance leverage disparity—the
seeking of advantages over an opponent
more disposed to comply with the law.
Kittrie attributes the rise of lawfare to
three factors: the increased number and
reach of international laws and tribunals,
the rise of nongovernmental organizations focused on the law of armed
conflict, and the advance of globalization and economic interdependence.
Kittrie follows up his macro-level
conceptual analysis with detailed case
studies at the micro level that exemplify
the prevalent trends in lawfare. His
examples move from the battlefields of
the Middle East through the courtrooms
of New York to the doctrinal manuals of
the Chinese military. The range of examples, all linked by the common theme
of lawfare’s increasing effectiveness,
underscores how widespread and multifaceted the phenomenon has become.
Kittrie devotes four of his eight chapters
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which
he describes (p. 197) as “the closest thing
the world has to a lawfare laboratory.”
For example, Israel’s experience with
maritime law in 2011 demonstrates how
“offensive” lawfare can achieve a military
objective without using force. In May
2010, Israeli forces intercepted a flotilla
of ships from Turkey attempting to violate a blockade of the Hamas-controlled
Gaza Strip, killing nine people. A UN
fact-finding mission subsequently
criticized Israel for its handling of the
incident. Faced with a similar flotilla
preparing to leave Greece in June 2011,
Israeli lawyers used legal measures to
stop the ships from leaving port. Those
measures included threatening legal
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action against companies providing
the ships with essential services such as
maritime insurance. In letters to these
companies, Israeli lawyers referenced
the U.S. Supreme Court case of Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project (561 U.S.
1 [2010], 130 S.Ct. 2705) to argue that
providing services to the flotilla was illegal because it supported terrorism. The
letters proved persuasive. By rendering
the ships unable to secure the necessary
services to gain permission to leave their
Greek ports, Israel succeeded in stopping
the 2011 flotilla without firing a shot.
Kittrie devotes a chapter to China’s innovative approach to lawfare. He explains
how China systematically wages lawfare
across the strategic operating environment, including maritime, aviation,
and space lawfare, as well as lawfare
in cyberspace. For example, Kittrie
analyzes how China is using maritime
law to justify denying access to the South
China Sea for international navigation.
China has developed a concept of lawfare it calls falu zhan, or “legal warfare,”
as part of its military doctrine. Kittrie’s
case studies show how China incorporates lawfare into its strategy through a
comprehensive approach coordinated
across the Chinese government.
Unlike China, the United States has no
similar comprehensive lawfare strategy. Kittrie describes how parts of the
U.S. government nevertheless have
employed legal techniques successfully to achieve strategic results, such as
the U.S. Treasury’s use of international
financial laws against Iran. Some of the
most effective U.S. lawfare has been the
work of private-sector attorneys rather
than U.S. government actions. Kittrie
provides several examples of litigation that used the Antiterrorism Act
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of 1990. A significant case was Boim
v. Holy Land Foundation, in which attorneys working on behalf of the family
of a U.S. victim of terrorism secured a
judgment against Islamic fund-raising
organizations, drying up a significant
source of material support to Hamas.
Kittrie concludes with a compelling
argument for a more creative and innovative integration of lawfare into
U.S. strategy. As he observes (p. 96),
the 2015 National Security Strategy
identifies security challenges that are
decentralized, transcend state borders,
involve nonstate actors, and “cannot
be neutralized using only deterrence
or the United States’ traditional kinetic toolbox.” Lawfare underscores
why strategists must have a practical
understanding of the entire spectrum of
factors affecting the strategic operating
environment—informational, cultural,
political, economic, social, and legal.
Kittrie understands that it is unrealistic
to expect strategists and policy makers
to be legal experts as well, so his conclusions include an analysis of the sources
of “lawfare power” and recommendations for leveraging the skills of the U.S.
legal community. To show how privatesector expertise can inform potential
military uses of lawfare, Kittrie describes
how Special Operations Command
Pacific reached out to the University of
Pennsylvania’s law school for research on
foreign criminal laws that could be used
to detain and prosecute foreign fighters
supporting the Islamic State. In Kittrie’s
assessment (p. 32), if the United States
properly leverages its extensive legal
expertise to support a national lawfare
strategy, the “U.S. advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has the potential
to be even greater than its advantage
in sophisticated lethal weapons.”
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Lawfare reminds us that lethal force
is only one of many factors affecting
outcomes in war. Kittrie points the way
toward how legal factors can be used to
achieve practical effects. Military officers
and policy makers who read this book
will be rewarded with a better understanding of the legal dynamics that are
exerting an increasingly powerful influence on the legitimate use of violence.
KEVIN ROUSSEAU

Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II, by John M. Lillard. Lincoln: Potomac Books, Univ. of Nebraska Press,
2016. 224 pages. $39.95 (Kindle $26.37).

With the Navy’s recent efforts to reinvigorate war gaming, there has been
renewed interest in the interwar gaming
conducted at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island. In the Naval
War College Review, Proceedings, and
other maritime journals, war-gaming
experts and enthusiasts alike have tried
to characterize the nature and value of
the Navy’s war games played between
1919 and 1941. John Lillard’s Playing
War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II is the latest
contribution to this resurgence. Seeking to provide a comprehensive study
of the interwar games conducted at the
College, Lillard intends to inform our
understanding of the “navy’s transition”
during this period. Playing War asserts
(p. 8) that the Newport games were
“transformational” and played a “central
role . . . in preparing the navy for war.”
For the most part, the author contributes
to the history of that era, but does so
with a work that would have benefited
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